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Findings on the effect of remittances on labor supply in Mexico are mixed. Hanson (2007) finds that, after controlling for observable characteristics, individuals are less likely to participate in the labor force if their household has sent migrants abroad or has received remittances from abroad. 2 He also concludes that during the 1990s, a time of high migration, women from high-migration states became less likely to work outside the home than women from low-migration states. This suggests that remittances might reduce labor supply among those remaining in Mexico, although the effect could be due to migration instead. In contrast, CoxEdwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009) find no systematic difference in labor force behavior between households that receive remittances and those that do not.
Likewise, there is no clear consensus regarding the impact of remittances on income inequality. Some research suggests that the relationship between remittances (and migration) and inequality is an inverse-U shape, with inequality first increasing as migration and remittances rise from relatively low levels (Koechlin and León 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007) .
Inequality eventually falls as higher levels of migration expand networks and drive down migration costs and as remittances rise, allowing lower-income families to migrate and share in the benefits. Other studies conclude that the net effect of migration and remittances is to exacerbate income inequality (e.g., Barham and Boucher 1998; Mora Rivera 2005) while some find evidence that remittances have no effect or reduce inequality (e.g., Acosta et al. 2006 Acosta et al. , 2007 .
For the Mexican case, previous research suggests that remittances increase income inequality. For instance, Mora Rivera (2005) shows that international remittances increase the Gini coefficient-a measure of inequality-in rural Mexican communities. However, he concludes that domestic remittances, from workers moving within Mexico, reduce the Gini 2 Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2009) find that labor supply also responds to the volatility in remittances.
coefficient. These differing impacts could be driven by migrant selection. If domestic migrants are from the lower end of the income distribution, their migration should boost incomes among poor households, reducing income disparities rather than increasing them.
Previous studies have also addressed the question whether remittances reduce poverty.
Most research concludes that remittances do reduce poverty rates, albeit perhaps modestly in some countries (Adams and Page 2005; Acosta et al. 2007) . For the Mexican case, one study indicates that remittances reduce the likelihood of being in poverty by 10 to 14 percent (Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda 2007) . López-Córdova (2005) shows that the fraction of households receiving remittances is negatively associated with the poverty rate across all Mexican municipalities in the year 2000.
The impact of remittances on education may be particularly important for economic development in the long run. Most Mexico-based research finds evidence of a positive effect of remittances on education outcomes. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) suggest that living in a household with a U.S. migrant increases years of schooling among girls whose parents have low education levels. Remittance inflows raise household income and relax credit constraints, which perhaps enables families to pay school fees and delay girls' entry into the labor force. Borraz (2005) finds a positive but small effect of remittances on schooling, with the impact only occurring for children living in cities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants and whose mothers have a very low level of education. López-Córdova (2005) shows that the fraction of households receiving remittance income is positively associated with school attendance rates and negatively associated with child illiteracy rates across Mexican municipalities in year 2000.
Recent Trends in the Mexico Case
household level in Mexico is of particular interest because the country has experienced a staggering outflow of workers and large remittance inflows. About 8 million people-over 15 percent of the Mexican-born labor force-have migrated to the United States in recent years.
There is considerable controversy about the relative skill level of these emigrants, with some studies contending that out-migrants are drawn from the bottom of the skill distribution (e.g., Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007) and others suggesting that they are from the top half or middle of the skill distribution (e.g., Chiquiar and Hanson 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005) . Having grown at double-digit rates for many years, remittances to Mexico reached an all-time high of almost $24 billion in 2007, occupying third place as a foreign exchange generator for Mexico after oil and maquiladora exports.
The traditional migrant-sending regions of Mexico, primarily the central states, benefit disproportionately from remittances, as shown in Figure 1 . The poorer central-western states attract most of the remittance flows, with Michoacán at the top with almost $2.5 billion in 2008 (or 10 percent of gross state product, or GSP), followed by Guanajuato with $2.3 billion (6.1 percent of GSP), Estado de México with $2.1 billion (2.2 percent of GSP) and Jalisco with $1.9 billion (3.0 percent of GSP). In richer regions, such as Distrito Federal or the northern Mexican states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Coahuila and Tamaulipas, remittances are less than 2 percent of GSP and play a much smaller role in the state economy.
This study examines the effect of remittance inflows on several indicators of economic development at the state level in Mexico and makes several important contributions that complement the existing literature. As discussed below, studying remittances and development at the state level captures the net effect of transfers across recipient and non-recipient households, an aggregate average effect that micro studies do not capture. In addition, if remittances are better measured at more aggregate levels than at the household level, using state-level data reduces measurement error and enhances estimates of remittance effects. Using state-level data also reduces concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and selection bias, which are difficult problems to address at the household level. Despite this, we address any remaining endogeneity by instrumenting for remittances using migrant-weighted U.S. wages and unemployment rates.
The two-stage least squares results suggest that remittances shift the wage distribution to the right, shrinking the share of lowest-wage workers, but do not boost school enrollment rates.
Remittances also appear weakly related to lower unemployment rates, but we do not find significant effects on average wages or employment.
Theoretical Framework
Remittances are likely to affect wages and employment both at the household level and in the aggregate. If leisure is a normal good, remittances should reduce labor supply among recipient households by creating a pure income effect. Although this reduction in labor supply partially offsets the positive income impact of remittances, the increase in income should cause the aggregate demand curve to shift out, resulting in greater production of goods and services overall. The increase in aggregate demand and the reduction in labor supply from recipient families should both boost wages, which will lure some members of non-recipient families into the labor force. While remittances should cause wages to rise, the skill levels and hence the wages of recipient and non-recipients, could be very different. If so, compositional effects could mask the wage effect by causing the average wage to fall even though workers earn higher wages. Meanwhile, the net effect of higher remittances on employment and unemployment rates is ambiguous-it depends on the relative magnitude of the changes in labor supply among recipient and non-recipient households and on labor demand.
Remittances are also likely to have distributional effects. The income distribution changes if there is selection in which households receive remittances or if remittances alter the wage distribution. Suppose, for example, that remittances are primarily received by households in the middle of the income distribution. Concomitant reductions in labor supply from these households should first and foremost raise wages for similar workers; relative wages at the bottom and top ends of the skill distribution could rise or fall, depending on the degree of substitutability of workers of different skill levels. If remittances help recipients invest in businesses, as might be the case in the presence of credit constraints, there might be further distributional effects vis-à-vis wages.
In addition, in a flexible exchange rate regime, remittances drive up the exchange rate and reallocate activity away from the tradable sector into non-tradables as home country exports become less competitive. Workers in the non-tradable sector thus may benefit at the expense of workers in the tradable sector. In sum, the net impact of remittances on the income and wage distributions is theoretically ambiguous.
All of these simple predictions-or lack thereof-ignore any direct effects of the outmigration that is a necessary precondition for remittances. Out-migration should boost wages and reduce employment rates as workers move abroad. Indeed, research finds a significant positive correlation between Mexican wages and out-migration (Hanson 2007; Mishra 2007) . In addition, the distribution of wages may change, depending again on whether emigrants are drawn from a particular segment of the skill or wage distribution and on the degree of substitutability of workers of different skill levels. Some research suggests that relative wages for low-skilled workers have fallen in Mexico as a result of out-migration (Aydemir and Borjas 2007) . Unemployment rates may rise or fall, depending on whether out-migrants were unemployed, while employment rates almost surely rise since the population is falling.
If households face binding credit constraints, remittances may boost investment in both human and physical capital. Evidence for Mexico suggests that remittances may relax credit constraints for the very poor and can lead to more child schooling (Borraz 2005; Hanson and Woodruff 2003) . However, migration may confound the positive effect of remittances on education (McKenzie and Rapoport 2006) . Children who anticipate migrating to the U.S. in the future have less incentive to accumulate education given that the return to education is lower in the U.S. than in Mexico.
Advantages of State-Level Analysis
Remittances have been linked to a host of beneficial outcomes, such as lower poverty, greater investment in education and health, and increased entrepreneurial activity. Most of these linkages have been made by comparing recipient to non-recipient households in household-level data, although some studies also compare countries. This study takes a different approach by examining the effect of remittances over time at the state level. The advantage of state-level analysis is first and foremost that all formal transfers are captured by the data. The volume and growth rate of official remittances to Mexico are much higher than those implied by household survey data from senders and receivers and by other measures, such as U.S.-Mexico remittance estimates supplied by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Also, the remittance impact is not limited to recipients. When remittances are large, as is the case in some Mexican states, non-recipients are affected by ensuing changes in labor and capital markets. Aggregate analysis captures these indirect, general equilibrium effects.
An additional advantage of aggregate analysis is that concerns about endogeneity bias are smaller than in household-level studies because the remittance impact is measured across all households, not just recipient families. At the household level, both remittances and migration are likely to be endogenous with respect to outcomes of interest. Migration and remittances are often a response to household needs and priorities, so the causality runs both ways. For example, do remittances improve schooling outcomes, or are families who want to invest in schooling more likely to send a member abroad who will remit funds? McKenzie and Sasin (2007) note the "pervasive endogeneity" in such household-level decisions and urge using differences or instrumental variables techniques to control for bias arising from reverse causality, selection and omitted variables. Moreover, at the household level at a single point in time, the confounding effects of migration make the remittance impact hard to study. Children may leave school to fill in for a father when he migrates. The remittances he eventually sends back may allow the children to return to school. On net, then, there might be no change in children's educational attainment.
Time-varying data of the kind we use here can also better capture the effect of remittances than most household surveys, which tend to be cross-sectional.
In addition to the literature using household-level data to measure the impact of remittances, studies have also used cross-country data to examine the effect of remittances on economic variables like GDP, income inequality and poverty. Such studies typically pool crosssectional or time-series data on a number of countries either around the world or in a certain geographic area, such as Latin America (e.g., Acosta et al. 2006 Acosta et al. , 2007 . Using time-series data allows such studies to include country fixed effects in order to control for time-invariant, unobservable differences across countries. We implicitly take a similar approach by comparing states within a single country. The advantage here is that states are more economically, culturally, and geographically similar than different countries. Examining states within a single country gives the advantages of time-varying data in cross-national studies while removing potential problems arising from country-specific changes over time that are difficult to model empirically, such as changes in political regime or in enforcement of property rights.
Using aggregate data may lessen concerns about unobservable heterogeneity between recipient and non-recipient (or migrant and non-migrant) households but does not completely mitigate all endogeneity or selection problems. As in the household case, reverse causality may be a problem since both migration and remittances are likely to depend on macroeconomic conditions. Our use of state fixed effects reduces such concerns about endogeneity bias. In addition, we implement a two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification where we instrument for remittances using migrant-weighted measures of U.S. wages and unemployment rates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and wages from the Covered Employment and Wages (CEW) data. Previous research has used U.S. earnings and unemployment to instrument for remittances (see, for example, Amuedo-Dorantes, Georges, and Pozo 2008).
Data and Methodology
Our measure of remittances is the state breakdown of We merge quarterly state-level remittances with quarterly state-level data on employment, unemployment, and median wages per hour from Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo or ENOE (in real pesos, deflated using regional Mexican CPI). ENOE captures all employment, both formal and informal. It is important to have a direct measure of employment and wages based on all workers, since research suggests that remittances have a large impact on the informal sector (Brambila 2008) , and this impact may differ from the effect on the formal sector if formal sector workers are less likely to be migrants. In addition, the formal sector in foreign direct investment (FDI) and state annual average labor force-formal plus informal-as control variables.
While our analysis of wages, employment, and unemployment is conducted at the quarterly level, we use annual data on school enrollment and the wage distribution. For that portion of the analysis, we merge annual remittances with enrollment rates and measures of the wage distribution. The enrollment rates are measured at the primary, secondary, tertiary, and vocational ('technical') school levels. The wage distribution measures are the fractions of workers earning less than or equal to the national minimum wage, 1-2 times the minimum wage, 2-3 times the minimum wage, 3-5 times the minimum wage, and more than 5 times the minimum wage. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 , and data details and sources are listed in Appendix Table 1. All quarterly variables are seasonally adjusted with the exception of remittances; the state remittance series is currently too short (only 20 observations per state) to run a seasonal adjustment. As discussed below, we include time fixed effects in the regressions, which should help control for any remaining seasonality.
Methods
We take a simple approach to examining the effect of remittances on measures of economic development within Mexican states. We regress the quarterly or annual state-level measure of economic development on real remittances received in that state. We also control for FDI and the size of the labor force.
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We take the natural log of the dependent variable in the employment and wage regressions, while other outcomes (unemployment rate, wage distribution, enrollment rates) are fractions expressed as percents (multiplied by 100). Specifications include state fixed effects and, in some cases, time fixed effects:
where s indexes states and t indexes time (which is either annual or quarterly, depending on the dependent variable). We estimate Huber-White standard errors clustered on the state.
This simple specification has several advantages. In the fixed effects models, the state effects control for unobservable differences that are fixed over time, such as distance from the U.S. border, while the time fixed effects control for changes that are common to states, such as changes in the U.S. or Mexican economy.
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Ideally we would also control for time-varying, statelevel measures of economic conditions that affect the outcomes of interest but are not endogenous or affected by remittances, but aside from FDI and labor force estimates, there are no such variables for which data are readily available. Because there are likely to be larger effects of remittances in high-migration states, we limit the sample to high-migration Central Mexican states in some specifications.
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As discussed earlier, any general equilibrium effects of remittances are more likely to appear in this sample where spillover effects should be large.
Endogeneity bias is a concern because remittances increase in response to economic hardship. We address the dual causality by using U.S. wages and unemployment rates as instrumental variables for remittances. Instruments must be correlated with remittances but not 6 We also tried specifications controlling for state-specific time trends in addition to state and time fixed effects but the trends wiped out all the results. The time series is presumably too short (only 5 years) and does not have the necessary power to estimate trends in addition to the other coefficients, particularly with regard to the annual data. Including state trends produces little change in goodness of fit of the regressions as measured by adjusted R 2 , which is already 0.99 when the state and time fixed effects are included. 7 The high-migration Central Mexico sample drops the following states: Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Querétaro, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas and Yucatán. 9 We base the location information on the first and last trips of all adult migrant workers who migrated to the U.S. in 1980 or later. For the 12 Mexican states that are not in MMP, we assigned the location distributions of the neighboring state deemed closest with regard to geographic proximity and most similar with regard to demographic profile. Details are available on request. 10 The CPS wage is the median real weekly wage of all workers aged 18-49 in the merged outgoing rotation group files. Weekly wages under $100 were dropped before taking the median. The CEW wage is the average real weekly wage for all workers in private-sector industries covered by unemployment insurance.
variables. However, the instruments have greater power in the regressions that do not include time fixed effects, as shown by the F-tests.
Results
We find mixed evidence that remittance flows affect economic development. Table 2 shows employment, wage, and unemployment effects of remittances for the OLS and 2SLS
regressions on the full sample of Mexican states in columns 1 and 2. The analysis for employment, wages, and unemployment is repeated on a smaller sample of Central Mexican states in Table 2 where workers migrate to the tourist areas on the Yucatán peninsula). Columns 1 and 3 control for state fixed effects while columns 2 and 4 add time fixed effects. Our preferred specification is the 2SLS specification with time fixed effects, but we caution that the panel is very short.
The OLS results in the top panel of Table 2 suggest that remittances may affect employment and wages. In the sample of all states, higher remittances appear to boost wages (column 1) and reduce employment (column 2). A similar result holds for wages in highmigration states (column 3), while the estimated effect on employment switches from positive to negative when time fixed effects are included. This suggests that good macroeconomic conditions drove up both employment and remittances; adding time effects controls for this omitted variable. The negative correlation between remittances and employment observed in columns 2 and 4 in both the full and high-migration samples can likely be attributed to the endogenous nature of remittances and migration vis-à-vis employment growth. Low-growth years are associated with higher out-migration and more remittances. This is one of the reasons we turn to instrumental variables regressions.
When we instrument for remittances, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 2 , the employment and wage effects are positive when time fixed effects are not included (columns 1 and 3). When time fixed effects are included, however, there are no statistically significant results at conventional levels. There appear to be negative effects on the unemployment rate in the sample of high-migration states (column 4), although the coefficient lies just outside the standard cutoff p-value of 0.10. Still, the magnitude of the coefficient suggest that an additional $100 million in remittances in a quarter will reduce the unemployment rate by 1.95 percentage points. This is a large effect.
The fact that remittances do not increase employment but may lower the unemployment rate suggests that the labor force could be contracting. Unemployed workers may leave the labor force or trade places with employed workers that choose to exit as remittances rise. Either way, the results suggest that remittances do not cause the labor force to expand, which is consistent with the results of other studies. Table 3 reports remittance effects on the wage distribution. The layout of the results is the same as in Table 2 . The OLS results indicate that remittances shift the wage distribution to the right, with declines in the share of workers who are earning less than one times the minimum wage per day and significant increases in the share of workers earning either two to three or three to five times the minimum wage per day. Remittances are generally not related to the share of workers who are top earners (more than five times the minimum wage), at least not in the presence of time fixed effects. These workers are the most likely to be formal-sector workers and the least likely to become international migrants or receive remittances.
The distributional effects of remittances are enhanced in the 2SLS specifications. As can be seen in the lower panel of Table 3 , the coefficient on remittances have the same signs as in the OLS specifications but are larger in magnitude. Focusing on column 4, remittances appear to shrink the fraction of workers earning at most the minimum wage by over two percentage points and boost the share who earns two to three times the minimum wage by 1.6 percentage points.
As with the employment and unemployment results, coefficients typically are larger in highmigration states than in all states and when not controlling for time fixed effects. Since remittances primarily benefit poor households and the non-tradable sectors, such as food production and construction, it makes sense that low-wage workers benefit disproportionately and are pushed up in the wage distribution, particularly in heavily-affected states. Alternatively, the lowest-wage workers may be disappearing from the wage distribution if they leave the labor force as a consequence of receiving remittances.
Middle or positive selection of Mexican migrants may also help explain some of the distributional consequences of remittances with regard to wages. Workers who are most similar to the out-migrants are more likely to receive remittances and to benefit from the reduced ranks in the labor market. This may underlie part of the large increase in the share of the workers earning wages of two to three times the minimum wage in high-migration states in the 2SLS specification. Table 4 shows the results from the school enrollment rate regressions for the full sample and the high-migration subsample. In keeping with much of the household-level evidence on remittances and schooling, we find that, without time controls, remittances appear to increase enrollment rates at almost all levels of schooling. Remittances appear to be positively and significantly correlated with higher primary, secondary, and university enrollment rates in both the full sample of states and the high-migration subsample. However, once we include time fixed effects, the remittance coefficients become statistically insignificant. This suggests that remittances are increasing in the years during which enrollment rates are also rising. The positive relationship is simply two concurrent trends, remittance growth (as in Figure 1 ) and the welldocumented rise in schooling in Mexico. Our state-level regressions are not able to capture a causal relationship between remittances and schooling. Given the complexity underlying enrollment rates, including demographic composition, more detailed data are likely needed to identify the true effect of remittances on schooling.
Conclusion
A look at remittances in Mexican states suggests that they have important effects on economic development. Higher remittances appear correlated with reductions in unemployment in high-migration states, although this result is weak. A longer time series will likely bolster these findings. Still, the fact that remittances do not appreciably increase employment while lowering unemployment is consistent with either no effect of remittances on the labor force or a negative effect, which is what theory of the income effect would suggest.
A more robust finding is the beneficial impact of remittances on the wage distribution, where higher remittances in high-migration states lead to fewer low-wage workers. Remittances appear to shift the wage distribution up and bolster the middle of the wage distribution, either because of selective exits or demand-side effects. We found no effects of remittances on school enrollment rates once we controlled for time fixed effects. The beneficial schooling effects found in previous research are not apparent in data at this level of aggregation. Our failure to find enrollment effects could be due to using state-instead of household-level data or could result from our controlling for the endogeneity of remittances. Our findings suggest the need for further research on the effect of remittances on enrollment. This issue is particularly important given the increases in educational attainment are likely the best source of long-term economic growth for developing countries like Mexico. 
